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Comment
DEPRECIATION DAMAGES:
A CONDEMNOR'S WINDFALL
I. N ODUCTION
In many instances, landowners suffer economic loss between the
announcement of a public improvement where private land will be
acquired and the actual condemnation of that land. A good example
of this "planning blight"' can be seen in Lincoln, Nebraska, where
the Northeast Radial will be built.2 The initial study for the North-
east Radial was begun in the 1950's, and actual acquisition of the
property began in 1968. Acquisition for the Radial has been pro-
ceeding quite rapidly, with construction to begin, tentatively, in
the target area in the summer of 1972.3 With the enactment of
LB1904 in the 1971 session of the Nebraska Legislature, acquisition
has almost come to a complete standstill, more than likely delaying
the construction for a longer period of time. This law provides
relocation payments for persons displaced due to land acquisition
by a governmental subdivision of the state. Although LB190 will
help to alleviate some of the problems that residents in the North-
east Radial area may have, under the existing Nebraska Statutes
there is still no compensation for the depreciation of land value
that occurs between the time of the announcement of the proposed
improvement and the actual date of condemnation.
This comment will explain the problem in detail: It will describe
what some state courts, other than Nebraska's, have done to ease
1 Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain: Irreverence for Un-
constitutional Practice, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 319, 327 (1963).
2 After public hearings to develop the plan, the Northeast Diagonal
Highway was made a part of the Comprehensive City Plan, Lincoln,
Neb., completed in Aug., 1942, and prepared by Harland Bartholomew
& Associates, St. Louis, Mo. It was defined in the Comprehensive
Regional Plan, prepared by the same consultants and adopted by the
Lincoln City-Lancaster County Planning & Zoning Com'n, on April
12, 1961. A later detailed study called for an elevated, limited access,
four lane thoroughfare to run from near downtown Lincoln in a north-
easterly direction for approximately five miles, and acquisition for
right-of-way covered a one block wide area.
3 The initial acquisition area, where construction of the Northeast Diag-
onal was to begin, was designated by the Director of Public Utilities
in the spring of 1970.
4 NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 76-1201 to -1212 (Supp. 1971). This law follows the
standards of the Federal Relocation Act of 1970 in setting up reloca-
tion payments for individuals displaced by federal projects.
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the problem; it will show what the Nebraska Supreme Court has
said in regard to "just compensation for land owners"; and it will
demonstrate the procedures adopted by some state legislatures to
aid the landowner. This should show a trend across the nation to
compensate landowners for this depreciation, and it may point the
way Nebraska will be traveling in the future.
II. THE PROBLEM
A landowner's right in eminent domain is established by the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Part I,
Section 21 of the Nebraska Constitution.6 They provide that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion.
In 1951 the Nebraska Legislature enacted the Uniform Act for
Eminent Domain,7 which provided a uniform procedure for all
agencies s with the power of condemnation.9 There must be an offer
and bonafide attempt to negotiate, and proceedings may be brought
if the parties fail to agree; whereupon the petition to condemn may
be filed by the condemnor in the county court of the county where
the property is located. ° Of course, in many instances, the property
values in an area to be condemned will increase, e.g., where specu-
lation involves the possibility that one may be able to put in a gas
station or receive a better access to his property, but not every
project will cause a rise in real estate values. Where the proposed
condenination is for a junk yard, city dump or an airport, the result
would generally be a decrease in value. The landowner should not
then be penalized because his property is going to be used for that
purpose rather than for another purpose where the land value
would increase. This phenomenon has been referred to as "planning
blight.""
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall private property be taken or
damaged for public use, without just compensation therefore."
6 NEB. CONST. art I, § 21. "The property of no person shall be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation therefor."
7 N.,. REv. STAT. § 76-701 et seq. (Reissue 1966).
s Fitle, Procedure Under the New Eminent Domain Act of 1951, 35 NEB.
L. REy. 259 (1956).
9 Certain exceptions are the condemnation of an existing public utility,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-703 (Reissue 1966), and of public school lands,
NEB. REV. STAT. § 72-224.01 et seq. (Reissue 1966).
10 Salter, Nebraska Procedure in Eminent Domain, 38 NEB. L. RE. 441-44
(1959).
1 Note 1 supra.
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The cloud of condemnation hanging over the landowner's prop-
erty between the announcement of the project and the actual time
of acquisition is a serious economic and social problem. It freezes
the owner's right to sell the land during this period of time; tenants
will move out and become impossible to replace; the landowner will
have no desire to keep up his property since it will be torn down
soon and repair is actually an economic waste. The city can even
go so far as to enforce strictly building codes and enact ordinances
restricting building or construction of improvements. Police protec-
tion may drop off, vandalism will be encouraged, property values
will drift downward to almost nothing.
The general rule is that a mere declaration of an intention to
take, or even a threat to take, does not constitute a taking under
the Fifth Amendment.'2 "Planning blight" is caused by the combi-
nation of many factors, and once begun, it feeds upon itself. The
owner actually could not sell if he wanted to sell. It would be a
waste of money to improve his property, so he must just sit and
wait until the condemnor decides to file his Petition of Condemna-
tion. When that finally happens, the landowner will end up with a
small portion of what his actual value would have been had his land
not been subjected to the threat of condemnation. The Fifth Amend-
ment does not require compensation for losses or expenses incurred
by owners or tenants incidental to, or as a consequence of condemna-
tion if they are not reflected in the market value of the land at the
time of the taking.'3 The uncertainty caused by the probability that
the proceedings will be carried through and the proposed construc-
tion will begin on the prospective land differs in degree only from
the uncertainty surrounding other property which may, at any
time, be taken by eminent domain whenever it may lie in the path
of a public improvement. The decrease in the income, or any other
damages the landowner may suffer from such uncertainty are held
to be damnum absque injuria.14 These depreciation damages are
looked upon as just one of the costs of owning property and all a
matter of relativity between one piece of property and the next.
On the other hand, it seems prohibitive to ask the government
to pay for every injury suffered as the result of its projects when
the projects are for the public good and the public use. One could
also point out that the actual acts which physically depreciated the
-12 Woodland Market Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955 (6th
Cir. 1970); City of Brook Park v. Columbia Rd. Inv., Inc., 23 Ohio
Misc. 363, 256 N.E.2d 284 (1970).
13 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
14 A wrong done for which the law provides no remedy. 6 J. SACKMAN,
NICHOLS ON EINENT Doimm § 26.45 at 323 (3d rev. ed. 1965).
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property may not have been done by the condemnor, but may have
been done by the owner (in the case where he refuses to keep up
his property), or by some administrative agency (such as a building
inspections agency that will not allow the landowner to improve
his property), or by vandals and vermin. With the more recent
relocation assistance programs, such as LB19015 and the Federal
Relocation Assistant Act of 1970,16 there is even a greater tendency
for tenants to vacate, causing the landowner to lose his rentals,
which in turn causes even more rapid deterioration as the whole
area becomes more and more deserted.
III. UPDATE VALUATION TIME
It would appear that if just compensation is to be paid in these
cases, we should make an exception to the general rule that prop-
erty is valued for condemnation purposes as of the time of filing
the condemnation petition. An increasingly accepted method for
fairly treating property value fluctuation caused by the imminence
of condemnation is an updating of the time of valuation.'7 One of
the earliest cases to develop this approach was United States v.
Miller.8 In that case, land was condemned to allow the relocation
of a railroad which would be flooded in the development of the
Central Valley Reclamation Project. The project had been con-
templated for a considerable period,19 and the necessity of relocating
the railroad was foreseen in the original plans. The land taken had
been designated as one of the alternate routes of the railroad. Hold-
ing that evidence of enhancement in value should be excluded, the
Court said:
The question then is whether the respondents' lands were probably
within the scope of the project from the time the Government was
committed to it. If they were not, but were merely adjacent lands,
the subsequent enlargement of the project to include them ought
not to deprive the respondents of the value added in the mean-
time by the proximity of the improvement. If, on the other hand,
they were, the Government ought not to pay any increase in value
arising from the known fact that the lands probably would be con-
15 Note 4 supra.
16 Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies
Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4601 (1970).
17 Note, The Condemnor's Liability for Damages Arising Through Insti-
tuting, Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1967
UTAH L. REV. 548.
18 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
19 The project was authorized in 1932 and the property was condemned
Dec. 14, 1938.
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demned. The owners ought not to gain by speculating on probable
increases in value due to the Government's activities. 20
The Court here dealt with the question of the increase in value
arising from the government project, but the case is also cited in
instances of a depreciation in value. In United States v. Virginia
Electric & Power Co.,21 the majority of the Court held that in
allocating market value for agricultural uses between the owner
of the fee and the owner of an easement for power purposes, the
Court must exclude "any depreciation in value caused by the
prospective taking."- 2 The court cited the Miller case in reaching
its conclusion.
Ordinarily, in the absence of direct governmental interference
with the use and enjoyment of property, a de facto taking will not
be held to exist.2 The states are divided as to whether there should
or should not be compensation for the depreciation in value.24
IV. TRADITIONAL VIEW
In the cases in which compensation is denied, the courts have
sh6wn their concern for the problem of culpability. Usually, the
landowners in these cases ask for a date of valuation earlier than
the date of the taking, and they ask the court to construe as a
taking some act of the condemnor which led to the depreciation.
For the most part, the courts refuse to stray from the established
rule as to the date of valuation and require some actual physical
invasion by the condenor before they will declare a taking. Not
only in the traditional sense are damages set on the day of valua-
tion, but the amount of damages must be real. Only actual interests
in land will be compensated for in condemnation proceedings.
Damages for depreciation and loss of business are not recoverable.5
20 317 U.S. at 377.
21 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
= Id. at 636.
23 United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. 967.905
Acres of Land, Etc., Cook Co., Minn., 305 F. Supp. 83 (D. Minn. 1969).
24 Should be compensated: Lipinski v.- Lynn Redevelopment Authority,
355 Mass. 550, 246 N.E.2d 429 (1969); State ex rel. State Highway
Comm'n v. Vesper, 419 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967,; City of
Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963). Should
not be compensated: Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939);
Hempstead Warehouse Corp. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 572 (Ct.
CL 1951); Housing Authority of the City of Decatur v. Schroeder, 222
Ga. 417, 151 S.E.2d-226 (1966).
25 1. Livzy, ComiwATrO N nT U.S. § 22 at 249 (1969).
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There is no constitutional limitation in Nebraska on the right
to take private property for public use under the power of eminent
domain, except for the right to just compensation. 26 It has long
been the general rule in this state that the market value of land
taken by eminent domain proceedings are computable as of the date
of the taking, which is deemed to occur when the Petition for
Condemnation is filed.27 We arrive at two elements which must be
considered when determining what the landowner will receive: (1)
just compensation; and (2) the date of taking, i.e., when the Peti-
tion for Condemnation is filed.
Just compensation is measured by the loss to the landowner
caused by the appropriation of his property by the state. Compen-
sation for land taken by eminent domain is measured by the fair
market value of the property as of the date of the appropriation,
including any factor that would influence the market value in the
mind of a good faith purchaser.28 It would appear, then, that the
continuing depreciation of the worth of the land caused by the
proposed public improvement should be accounted for, since it
influences the market value.
There has not been a case in Nebraska specifically regarding
the question of depreciation damages, but the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Central Nebraska Public Power
& Irrigation District 29 ruled on appreciation in value. The court
said that the owner is entitled to the benefit of an appreciation
resulting from the general expectation of the construction and suc-
cessful operation of the condemning agency's irrigation system.
Therefore, there is no problem with appraisal of property at the
time of the condemnation when there is an increase in value, because
the court requires the time of taking to be the time of condemnation
and the appraisal to be made as close to that time, thereby estab-
lishing the value as of the date of taking. The same would be true
where a depreciation had occurred, but at a time when the value
of the land is considerably deflated. The rule is that the actual
appraisal must be made near enough to that point of time to furnish
a test of the market value as of the date in question, i.e., the date
of the filing of the Petition of Condemnation. °
26 Hammer v. Department of Rds., 175 Neb. 178, 120 N.W.2d 909 (1963).
27 Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist. v. Armstrong, 159 Neb. 609,
68 N.W.2d 200 (1955).
28 Iskey v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 185 Neb. 724, 178 N.W.2d 633
(1970).
29 139 Neb. 114, 296 N.W. 752 (1941).
30 Schmailzl v. State Dep't of Rds., 176 Neb. 617, 126 N.W.2d 821 (1964). In
this case, the improvements on the property condemned had been
DEPRECIATION DAMAGES: A CONDEMNOR'S WINDFALL 153
V. TRADITIONAL VIEWS, OTHER STATES
The Missouri Supreme Court does not feel that planning and an-
ticipation of a public improvement necessitate payment of damages.
In Hamer v. State Highway Commission, 1 the landowner was seek-
ing damages for his expenses involved in redesigning and replatting
his entire subdivision to conform to the plans of the highway com-
mission in their building of a road through his land when subse-
quently the State Highway Department decided not to build the
road. The court declined to give the landowner relief: "[I]n the
absence of bad faith or unreasonable delay upon the part of the
party which instituted such [condemnation] proceedings, .. .the
owner is not constitutionally entitled to recover .... ,,32 The Mis-
souri rule being that a decrease in income or other loss from such
uncertainty is held to be damnum absque injuria.33
In a Texas case, State v. Vaughn,34 tenants began moving out of
the landowner's building when they found out it was to be con-
demned. The Texas Appellate Court held that the resulting loss
was an incidental damage for which no compensation was due. The
Massachussets Supreme Court in Town of Swampscott v. Remis,-'
found that pending judgment of condemnation, the landowner's
property could not be sold nor improvements made profitably and
no income could be derived therefrom. The court ,claimed that
without a finding that the property is completely unusable, no,
compensation is due for the period between the adoption of the
order to take and the entry of the judgment of condemnation and
this does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States.
destroyed by the time of the trial, and the appraisals used as testimony
were made prior to the time of condemnation. The court allowed ear-
lier appraisals when made almost a year prior to the time of the
filing of the Petition of Condemnation in arriving at the market
value of the property. It should be noted that the trial court allowed
photographs to be offered, supposedly taken around the time of con-
demnation, to show the value of the property, since the jury could
not view the premises personally. Judge Carter, dissenting, and Justice
Brower, concurring in the dissent, stated that the evidence was to
remote to be allowed in this case and that in the case where the
measure of recovery is the market value of the property taken, the
price paid for the property is wholly immaterial. It has no relation,
whatsoever, to the market price of the property on the date of the
taking.
31 304 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. 1957).
32 Id. at 873.
33 A wrong done for which the law provides no remedy.
34 319 S.W.2d 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
3G 350 Mass. 523, 215 N.E.2d 777 (1966).
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VI. MODERN TREND
In the cases in which the property owner has been compensated
for depreciation in value, the courts have not usually been con-
cerned with what caused the damage to the property, i.e., whether
it be the fault of the condemnor, vandalism, or whatever; they are
really concerned with the actual loss to the landowner, what he
will suffer if he is not compensated. In an early landmark decision,
In re South Twelfth Street in City of Allentown, 6 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court allowed compensation for depreciation in value,
saying:
[T]he municipality in the furtherance of public ends, having
stripped the land of nearly its entire value [by plotting a street
forty years prior to opening it], now when it seeks to accomplish
fully its purposes in connection therewith, is to be allowed to ac-
quire the land by paying a sum measured by the little value the
municipality has left in it. Such a result would be a travesty on the
the constitutional provision which requires in all such cases just
compensation to be made for the property taken.37
In City of Buffalo v. J. W. Clement Co.388 the New York court
agreed with the trial court's findings that the acts of the city
(in making repeated statements that the property would be con-
demned as of a certain date) had destroyed the value of the land-
owner's property and made the property unfit for his present and
future use; relying upon those statements, the owner moved his
business; thus, it was held that there was a de facto taking of the
property four years prior to the condemnation proceedings. The
decision of the court was based heavily on the reliance factor. This
is one of the first cases where the theory of equitable reliance was
used in this type of depreciation case.3 9 The equitable reliance
theory is grounded upon the requirement that the one party either
intended or should have known that his act would induce such
reliance.
36 217 Pa. 362, 66 A. 568 (1907).
37 Id. at 366, 66 A. at 569.
38 34 App. Div. 2d 24, 311 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1970).
39 The court said: "While the general rule in eminent domain cases is
that a condemning authority does not become liable to a condemnee
until title to the property is officially taken . . . it is settled that a
de facto taking does occur when there has been a physical invasion
of a condemnee's property or a direct legal restraint on its use. . . ." Id.
at 29, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 103. The dissent follows the traditional theory
arguing that there was no de facto taking absent entry onto the
property and actual taking of possession.
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In City of Cleveland v. Carcione,40 the Ohio court compensated
the owner for "planning blight."41 The city of Cleveland had passed
a resolution that it intended to appropriate property for an urban
renewal project, and during the next six years it acquired and
demolished properties around Carcione's property.4 The court held
that where the value of a parcel of property has depreciated be-
cause of the action of the condemning authority, the owner of such
parcel is entitled to the fair market value of his property at the
time the condemning authority takes the first active steps which to
any extent depreciate the value of the property.43
An interesting case arose in a Michigan Federal District Court 44
concerning property owned by the Madison Realty Company and
located in an urban renewal project area in the City of Detroit.
Madison voluntarily conveyed the property to the city in 1965, then
brought suit claiming the city's activities constituted a taking prior
to the time of the voluntary transfer.45 The court decided that the
taking had actually occurred three years prior to the date the city
actually purchased the property because the city had denied build-
ing permits, refused to grant a reassessment for tax purposes, con-
tinued to inform the people in the area that it was going to be
condemned, and denied the landowner many city services. The
court said:
No Us pendens on file ever provided a more effective notice to the
public to avoid dealings with "the plagued"; no actual condem-
nation proceeding ever carried any greater finality from a busi-
ness standpoint than a constant, powerful, capable and continuously
published threat of condemnation. Initiation of eminent domain
proceedings is not a prerequisite to a finding that a 'taking" has in
fact occurred allowing for recovery by a property owner. The
totality of these acts by the Defendant City contributed to and
accelerated the decline in value of plaintiff's property in 1960 so as
40 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (1963).
41 Note 11 supra.
42 The income had dropped from over $8,000 in 1957 to less than $600
in 1961.
43 118 Ohio App. at 532, 190 N.E.2d at 56-57.
44 Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Mich
1970).
45 The city may have had a valid argument when it stated that plain-
tiff had waived all claims by accepting their offer and selling the prop-
erty voluntarily. If the realty company did not think the amount was
sufficient, they should have filed an inverse condemnation suit or
waited until the time of condemnation and declared full damages
in that manner.
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to constitute a "taking" of that property within the meaning of the
5th Amendment to the United States Constitution.46
In City of Cleveland v. Kacmarik,47 the city instituted a suit
to condemn the property, then tore down the landowner's building
for violating the building code. The Ohio court stated that the city
should not be allowed to condemn property, then exercise its police
power and destroy the building, thus escaping payment to the
owners; however, the court seemed to intimate that if the building
would have been uninhabitable prior to the condemnation suit and
torn down before filing the suit, the city would have been liable
for the building's value.48
Damages for land may be fixed at the value thereof before the
condemnation action. In Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community
Development Agency of the City of Paducah,49 the Kentucky court
stated:
[W]e have recognized the corollary rule that the "before" valua-
tion date is at the time just before it was generally known that
the public project would be performed ... the landowner is not to
be penalized for any depreciation in value attributable to the
public's learning of the condemnation .... 50
VII. APPLICABLE STATUTES
Both Pennsylvania and Maryland have statutes aimed at reliev-
ing depreciation damages. Pennsylvania statutes5' cite the time
when imminence of condemnation becomes general knowledge as
the date when the decrease in value should be excluded. Maryland
statutes52 state that the effective date of legislative authority for
the acquisition of such property is the period of time when a
46 315 F. Supp. at 371.
47 177 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961).
48 The court said: "It has long been held that a jury cannot evaluate
land being condemned as of the day when the legislative body passed
the resolution of condemnation, or as of the day of the filing of the
suit in court. In general, it is the law that 'in an appropriation case,
the value of the property being taken is to be determined as of the
time of the trial."' Id. at 813.
49 389 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965).
50 Id. at 456.
51 PA. STAT. tit. 26, § 1-604 (1964): "Any change in the fair market value
prior to the date of condemnation.., shall be disregarded in determ-
ining fair market value.
52 MD. ANN. CODE art. 33A, § 6 (1967): "[P]lus the amount, if any, by
which such price reflects a diminution in value . .. ."
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decrease in the market value should be excluded. The State of
New Jersey also has legislation53 which provides that the time of
taking shall be deemed to be the date when the redevelopment
agency declares that an area is blighted. This is the simple solution
in problems where there is going to be an urban renewal project,
but it does not, of course, aid the landowner when his land is
condemned for a highway.
Another alternative to this enigma would be the advance acquisi-
tion of land in an area where a proposed public improvement is to
be located. Allowing a state or its agencies to purchase property
at the time the plan is designed would alleviate depreciation prob-
lems and also any problems that might arise due to the landowner's
desire to build improvements on the property. The question is
whether such a law could be enacted without violation of constitu-
tional limitations, loss of tax revenue, and rigid commitments of
planning.5 4
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Nebraska damages are to be assessed as of the date the
condemnation petition is filed,5 5 and any depreciation damages shall
not be accounted for prior to that time.56 Although there have
been no Nebraska cases on point, this area of condemnation law is
in a state of change. And rightly so, as there is a serious question
as to whether there has been just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment applicable through the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment under the Nebraska law as it now stands. There
appears to be a national trend to account for the damages caused
by threat of condemnation. The grey area between a clear cut case
of a taking and a nontaking has been often classified as damnum
absque injuria.57 This grey area is diminishing through the liberali-
zation of the strictly construed valuation date.58 The courts and a
53 N.J. STAT. ANxl. § 20:1-9 (1967): "[I]f the land or other property is
being acquired in connection with development or redevelopment
of a blighted area, then.., the value ... shall be fixed and determined
to be no less than the value as of the date of the declaration of blight
by the governing body upon a report by a planning board."
54 52 M1nvm. L. Rxv. 1175 (1968).
55 Note 27 & 30 supra.
56 Note 25 supra.
57 Note 33 supra.
58 Notes 39 & 48 supra.
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small number of state legislatures are beginning to view social
values as an essential criteria in arriving at just compensation. The
legislative solutions of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey
have relieved some of the problems, but factual situations may still
arise where the landowner is still "shortchanged" out of his actual
loss. Lack of proof of damages will continue to be a problem in
evaluation in a condemnation case. Until the condemning agency
decides that it must assist the landowner in this problem (not claim-
ing its hands are tied by legislative limitations) or the legislature
provides for a means to compensate for "planning blight," the citi-
zen will not receive the just compensation that is his due.
James Cada '72
